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I. INTRODUCTION
A person, institution or activity might benefit from an exemption from
an otherwise applicable law. This exemption phenomenon is common through-
out state and federal law. Consider, for example, that some types of housing are
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exempt from certain restrictions of the Fair Housing Act,' and some businesses
are exempt from the requirements of the Family and Medical Leave Act.2
Whether the product of political compromise or of constitutional interpretation,
exemptions provide freedom from the reach of a given law.
This Article focuses on exemptions that benefit churches 3-whether
crafted by legislatures, courts, or agencies. These exemptions might benefit
religious institutions alone, or might benefit a broader category of institutions,
like non-profits, of which churches are a part. Some examples are familiar.
Churches are exempt from some applications of federal and state anti-
discrimination laws in the employment area. Sometimes churches are exempt
from certain regulations of their social service activities. And of course they are
tax exempt institutions, along with other non-profits. These and many other
religious exemptions give churches freedom from particular kinds of govern-
mental oversight, requirements or restrictions.
In October of 2006, the New York Times ran a four-part front-page se-
ries on the widespread existence of religious exemptions for churches.4  The
series read like an expos6 of abuse, focusing on aggrieved employees with no
recourse to courts, the dangers of unlicensed social services, and tax breaks for
non-traditional property uses that raise the tax burden on the rest of us. It pro-
vided a disturbing litany of privilege and social irresponsibility. The articles
echoed the voices of some commentators that have suggested that exemptions
invite conduct that harms the common good.5 But if this is so, why do courts
and legislatures continue to create them? Over two thousand religious exemp-
tions exist in state or federal law,6 with many exemptions created in the last fif-
teen years alone.7 Do exemptions exist primarily because of the political power
I See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2000) (exempting certain individual landlords) and §
3607(b) (exempting housing for older persons).
2 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 261 l(2)(B) (2000) (excluding small employers).
3 Throughout this article, the term "church" will be used generically to refer to any religious
institution, including worshipping communities as well as church-affiliated institutions for educa-
tion and social services. More precise language will be used when necessary
4 Diana B. Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions Grow, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2006, § 1, at 5; Diana B. Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at Al; Diana B. Henriques, As Religion Programs Expand, Disputes
Rise Over Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at A2; Diana B. Henriques, In the Congres-
sional Hopper: A Long Wish List of Special Benefits and Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006,
Al; and Religion-Based Tax Breaks: Housing to Paychecks to Books, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006,
at Al.
5 See, e.g., MARCi A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2005).
6 James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assess-
ment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992). This number reflects legislative exemptions, and is for
both churches and individuals. This number does not reflect exemptions granted by agencies or
the many judicial exemptions required by courts over the years.
7 See Henriques, Where Faith Abides, supra note 4.
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churches wield-as the Times series suggests? Or can a principled case be
made for religious exemptions from otherwise general laws?
Commentators cite a variety of justifications for judicial and legislative
religious exemptions, all of which are rooted in the vigorous protection of reli-
gious freedom under the Constitution. 8 First, there are the textual and historical
justifications. 9 The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion; ex-
emptions give expression to that value. And as a historical matter, exemptions
from oath taking and military conscription appeared as early as colonial times.10
In fact, James Madison supported an explicit conscience exemption from mili-
tary service in the text of the Bill of Rights."' Second, there is a related "quid
pro quo" justification: because exemptions express a free exercise value, they
balance those special restraints on religion required by the Establishment
Clause. 12 A third justification is that exemptions prevent violence and persecu-
tion (particularly as regards to minority faiths). 13 Yet another justification is
theological in nature: religious exercise is "intrinsically good," to be protected
as a natural right. 14 Further, based on the Madisonian argument that duties to
God are prior to civil duties, exemptions are necessary to avoid the severe per-
sonal distress that can emerge from conflicting demands of law and faith.15
This list omits two related justifications-at least with respect to
churches-that are consistent with and yet more plausible than the ones men-
tioned. I contend that some-maybe many-exemptions make sense because
churches: 1) function responsibly in the "space" created by the exemption by
filling that space with their own ethical-legal norms 16 and 2) promote the com-
8 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility
of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555, 560-66 (1998); JOHN H. GARVEY,
WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 254 (1996); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS
C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 236-38 (2d ed. 2006), but cf Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
915 (1992).
9 Gedicks, supra note 8, at 558-62.
10 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1467-69 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins].
I1I Id. at 1500.
12 See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611,
1643-44 (1993); MCCONNELL, GARVEY & BERG, supra note 8, at 236.
13 Gedicks, supra note 8, at 563-65.
14 Id. at 566-68. See generally GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?, supra note 8.
15 See generally McConnell, Origins, supra note 10.
16 For the idea that exemptions provide space for alternative normative systems to function,
see Perry Dane, Exemptions for Religion Contained in Regulatory Statutes, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 559-62 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006); Perry Dane, 'Omalous' Auton-
omy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715; Perry Dane, Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise
Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350 (1980) (employing a conflicts of
law analogy).
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mon good (or at least do not thwart it) by the conduct the exemption allows. 17
By generating their own religious norms of ethics and law, churches are consid-
ered capable of operating responsibly under conditions of freedom. Indeed,
because they are communities of moral meaning that have generated norms for
social and political (as well as religious) life, churches have played a significant
role in defining the common good. Not surprisingly, then, the state often ex-
pects that churches will support temporal needs and civic values.' 8 But because
such expectations lead to demands for social accountability-which can in turn
threaten religious freedom-many commentators who defend exemptions do not
want to consider their social impacts. This Article attempts to do just that. It
will explore the extent to which internal ethical-legal systems (what I call "legal
pluralism") are tolerated, and the extent to which minimal expectations of re-
sponsible religious exercise are attached to exemptions. In short, I argue that
exemptions are designed not for the exclusive protection of religious freedom,
but for the protection of both religious freedom and the socio-political commu-
nity that provides the conditions for the meaningful exercise of that freedom.
I propose to apply the common good argument-that churches, func-
tioning according to their own ethical-legal systems, are sometimes (maybe of-
ten) capable of advancing the common good-to all exemption questions,
whether judicial or legislative, and whether arising under the Free Exercise
Clause, the Establishment Clause,1 9 or religion-protective statutes like the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)20 and the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 21 The connection between exemptions and
the common good is scattered throughout the jurisprudence, but needs to be
explicitly drawn out and unified into one inquiry. The unified inquiry will vary
not by clause or statute but by type of exemption. The three main categories of
exemptions-those that protect institutional autonomy, those that lift financial
burdens, and those that promote the provision of social services--call for differ-
ent nuances in the balance between freedom and social accountability. This
project is especially important now that the United States Supreme Court has
17 See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). Chari-
table organizations are governed by "social norms that reinforce the legal restraints on profiteer-
ing" and "ethical constraints [that] may be far more important than legal sanctions in causing the
managers of nonprofits to adhere to their fiduciary responsibilities .... The importance of such
ethical constraints may also explain why so many nonprofit institutions-including, for example,
schools, hospitals, nursing homes, foster homes, and even housing project sponsors-are affiliated
with religious groups. For such an association may help to keep the norms intact and at the same
time assure potential patrons that in fact they are intact." Id. at 875-76 (emphasis in original).
18 See McConnell, Origins, supra note 10, at 1455-66, for a discussion of early state constitu-
tions, many of which provided for religious freedom to the extent it did not excuse licentiousness
or threaten the peace or safety of society.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
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suggested in two recent decisions the need to articulate the underlying connec-
tion between religious exemptions and their broader social and governmental
impacts.22
While this Article's main focus is on constitutional and statutory inter-
pretation, the inspiration for the common good argument is the concept of "re-
sponsible freedom" set forth in the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on
Religious Freedom.23 That document grounds religious freedom in the dignity
of the human person. It provides that "the right to religious freedom is exer-
cised in human society, hence its exercise is subject to certain regulatory norms.
• .. [Individuals and groups] are bound by the moral law to have respect for
both the rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for the
common welfare of all.",24 At the same time, the Declaration asserts a strong
presumption in favor of freedom "as far as possible, and curtailed only when
and in so far as necessary., 25 Therefore, using the rough guidance of these
signposts, together with other social, political and constitutional principles, the
common good argument is an attempt to work out a methodology for "responsi-
ble" religious freedom in the exemption context.
I use the concept of the common good intentionally, rather than the
"state's interest" or "general welfare," because it transcends these concepts and
more accurately captures the rich sense of the socio-political community.26 It
refers to
[T]he totality of goods that create the conditions in which per-
sons flourish. In its fullest sense, the common good describes
social conditions designed to enable the 'total human develop-
ment' of the person, such as human rights for individuals, social
health and development of the community, and a just, stable,
and secure order.27
It emerges from a broad consensus, achieved through deliberation and
prudential argument, "that is not necessarily the same as majoritarian determina-
22 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
23 Declaration on Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 675 (Walter M.
Abbott, S.J., ed., 1966) [hereinafter Declaration].
24 Id. at 685-86.
25 Id. at 687.
26 See Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States Constitu-
tion, 52 VILL. L. REV. 67, 88 (2007).
27 Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL THOUGHT 255, 266 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. and Angela Carmella,
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Carmella, A Catholic View]. The common good is "a set of social condi-
tions which facilitate the realization of personal goods by individuals." DAVID HOLLENBACH,
CLAIMS IN CONFLICT 64 (1979).
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tion,"28 and it may be, on some matters, of necessity plural rather than universal.
Thus, I claim that churches, along with other institutions in society, are capable
of providing some of those social goods that help create the conditions for hu-
man flourishing, and should enjoy exemptions that enable them to do so. Diffi-
culties in application arise, of course, where the very definition of human flour-
ishing is contested. Yet a focus on the common good requires us to ask "'what
is good for the person?' and not, 'what is good for the state and its institu-
tions? ,
,29
The role of exemptions in promoting the common good rests on a larger
vision of a vibrant, pluralistic civil society and the limited, yet activist role of
the state within it.30 This vision, drawn from contemporary political theory and
Catholic social thought, as well as the expectations of American constitutional
law, recognizes that all social institutions have responsibility for promoting the
common good, and that one of the state's main roles is to coordinate non-state
actors in this task. The state's other main (and related) role is to ensure the pub-
lic order-which is a piece of the larger common good-through laws that en-
force human rights, civic peace, and public morality. Exemptions may be fully
consistent with the state's public order function and the larger common good,
particularly when they allow institutions in civil society to engage in socially
responsible, stabilizing and beneficial activities.
The reader may be uncomfortable with an approach that involves the
"judgment" of religion, and in fact, some have argued eloquently that our sys-
tem is set up precisely to prevent the state from making such evaluations. 31 Of
course the state is barred from certain kinds of judgments about religion. It can-
28 Duncan, supra note 26, at 87-88.
The common good is inextricably bound to the good of individual persons, as
[Jacques] Maritain explains in his classic work, Man and the State: ... [that]
each concrete person, not only in a privileged class but throughout the whole
body politic, may truly reach that measure of independence which is proper to
civilized life and which is ensured alike by the economic guarantees of work
and property, political rights, civic virtues, and the cultivation of the mind.
Id.
29 Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious Free-
dom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1312 (2002) [hereinafter Garnett, School
Choice].
30 See John A. Coleman, A Limited State and a Vibrant Society: Christianity and Civil Society,
in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 223 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002);
Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND
DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 90 (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 2000) [hereinafter McConnell, Equal Citizens].
31 See generally GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR?, supra note 8. Michael Stokes Paulsen
notes that we protect religion broadly because "we do not trust political majorities, and we cer-
tainly do not trust government agents, to distinguish Truth from Rubbish and because it is exceed-
ingly difficult (and dangerous) to try to draft a religious freedom rule that successfully draws such
a line." God Is Great, Garvey is Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1597, 1606 (1997) (book review).
[Vol. 110
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not declare an official religion, or say that a belief is true or false, or give pref-
32
erences based on a particular religion. But in the context of exemptions, a
judgment regarding the social impact of an exemption is inevitable where a
court or legislature is trying to determine whether the goals of a law or the needs
of society will be undermined if the law is not uniformly applied. 33 Courts and
legislatures are always evaluating, even if implicitly and indirectly, the com-
patibility of exemptions with the common good and the congruence of alterna-
tive ethical-legal systems with broader societal norms. The only way to avoid
such judgments would be to allow absolute religious freedom or to impose only
the state's legal norms, neither of which is possible in our constitutional system.
By making the evaluation comprehensive and explicit, we are better able to con-
strain the state's decision making.
In light of the complexities posed by the phenomenon of religious ex-
emptions, this Article will continue as follows. Part II gathers the sources of the
common good argument, which are currently scattered throughout the religion
jurisprudence. Part IH develops the common good argument in the context of
the Religion Clauses, RFRA and RLUIPA, and then applies it to the three basic
categories of religious exemptions. Part IV describes two political and socio-
logical concepts that have been developed in Catholic social thought-
subsidiarity and the public order-which might help to avoid the extremes of
legal pluralism and legal authoritarianism.
II. LOCATING THE SOURCES OF THE COMMON GOOD ARGUMENT
The distinction between civil society and the state is fundamental to
contemporary political theory. 34 The state owes citizens a commitment to inclu-
sive and overarching norms. 35 But civil society is marked by "plural and par-
ticularist identities, 3 6 which are expressed in diverse non-political institutions:
families, schools, churches, neighborhood groups, ethnic/cultural/linguistic
groups, civic and voluntary associations of all kinds, labor unions, work-related
and professional associations, businesses, and large corporations.37 Many of
32 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33 Even Professor Paulsen concedes that "exemptions for religious believers are constitution-
ally required, except in the most compelling circumstances out of the strictest necessity." Paulsen,
supra note 31, at 1620 (emphasis added). A court would have to decide what constitutes those
circumstances.
34 Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 1
(Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002) [hereinafter Rosenblum & Post, Introduction].
35 Id. at 3.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 16-17. See also Jean Bethke Eshtain, Catholic Social Thought, the City, and Liberal
America, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM: THE CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL
TRADITION AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY 97 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds.,
1995).
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these institutions of civil society are also considered "mediating" institutions,
those "seedbeds of virtue" and "schools of citizenship" that mediate between
and among individuals, the state, and the market.38 Madison considered the
pluralism and particularity of civil society a source of its peace and stability.
For him, the vast multiplicity of social "factions" would serve as checks and
balances on each other so that none would gain power over the others.39 Thus,
contemporary political theory posits the central political concept of the foun-
ders: that the common good of civil society is generally promoted under condi-
tions of freedom, not restraint.4°
The state plays a critical role in coordinating the institutions of civil so-
ciety toward the common good, but this coordination, through law, must be
done in ways that respect the boundary between them. Several important consti-
tutional doctrines ensure that the state does not destroy the plural and particular
identities of social institutions. Under doctrines like expressive association,
some institutions are free to determine their members and leaders, and are not
forced to adopt the state's norms as their own.4 1 Doctrines under the religion
clauses protect the fundamental independence of civil society and the state, as
well as church and state. Associational freedoms generally involve freedom of
self-governance and the freedom to operate under alternative legal systems.42 In
these and other ways, the state disables itself not only in relation to individuals,
but also in relation to the mediating institutions in which those individuals are
nurtured, and respects the legal pluralism of alternative normative systems. It is
important to recall that where the state has refused to disable itself in these
ways, civil society is destroyed. Indeed, the major task of the last decade in the
former Soviet Republics and countries of Eastern Europe has been the building
of civil society. As an essential feature of democracy, civil society is always
considered the "bulwark" against state power.
38 See generally SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND
CrZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David Blankenhom eds., 1995); Catha-
rine Pierce Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justice: Making Churches Pay for the Sins
of their Clergy, 44 B.C. L. REv. 1201, 1204-09 (2003).
39 McConnell, Origins, supra note 10, at 1515; see also McConnell, Equal Citizens, supra
note 30, at 90 (comparing Rousseau and Madison).
40 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
41 See generally Richard Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Ex-
pression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841 (2001) [hereinafter Garnett, Associations].
42 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4, 32 (1983).
[N]orm generating aspects of corporation law, contract, and free exercise of
religion are all instances of associational liberty protected by the Constitution.
Freedom of association implies a degree of norm-generating autonomy on the
part of the association. It is not a liberty to be but a liberty and capacity to cre-
ate and interpret law-minimally, to interpret the terms of the association's
own being.
[Vol. 110
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Political theory recognizes not only a fundamental distinction between
civil society and the state, but their complementarity as well.4 3 The institutions
of civil society and the state are "permeable" to the influences of each other.
4
Even the definition of the common good, toward which the state coordinates the
efforts of non-state actors, is not set exclusively by the state, but is instead
"achieved by the processes of deliberative democracy. ''45
[C]ivil society needs the state for those public goods the state
alone can provide or guarantee: the coordination of order, a
structure of civility and peace among pluralist visions of the
good, the regulation of welfare and justice, the forging of a
'common civic faith and purpose' that cross-cuts any one par-
ticularist tradition .... In turn ... civil society offers a zone of
freedom, spontaneity, creativity, a grass-roots anchoring of 'be-
longing.' It remains the primary locale for the anchoring of vir-
tue.4
Thus, when political theorists posit the state as the realm of "inclusive,
overarching norms" and the civil society as the realm of the "particular and plu-
ral," we must be careful not to assume that the realms are necessarily antagonis-
tic. There can be, and often is, significant overlap and congruence, even part-
nership. Indeed, civil society is the very source of norms that might be made
universal through law. While mediating institutions of civil society serve as a
bulwark against the state, at the same time they impart values critical to good
citizenship and self-government and inspire democratic participation. Their
extensive charitable activities relieve the state of many burdens. Moreover,
complex interrelationships between and among governmental, non-profit and
for-profit institutions make it possible for them to collaborate on social welfare
programs.47 With specific reference to churches, political theorists "reflect not
only on tensions between obligations of citizenship and demands of faith but
also on ways in which religion complements and supports democratic citizen-
ship, or compensates for acknowledged limitations of democratic government
and civic identity.
' 48
43 Rosenblum & Post, Introduction, supra note 34, at 16-23.
44 Id. at 6.
45 Coleman, supra note 30, at 238.
46 Id. at 244.
47 Rosenblum and Post, Introduction, supra note 34, at 16-17.
48 Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH:
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 4 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000).
Paulsen states that "[w]e do not protect religious liberty for secular society's sake .... That secu-
lar society may benefit incidentally from [religious exercise] is all well and good, but the point is
to protect free exercise, not (except by some happy convenience) to produce the secondary bene-
fits to society." Paulsen, supra note 31, at 1600. Mediating institutions typically operate accord-
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In the following discussion, I use three Supreme Court opinions to illu-
minate both the boundary and complementarity between civil society and the
state.49 They reveal the ways in which the state evaluates the congruence be-
tween religious conduct and the common good. The Court recognizes a modest
legal pluralism and the significance of exemptions to the flourishing of institu-
tions within civil society. But other decisions and doctrinal developments show
how courts limit the "particular and plural" to make churches accountable when
their conduct threatens (or is thought to threaten) the common good.5°
A. Church Autonomy: Watson v. Jones
51
Exemptions from otherwise general laws raise a question in stark terms:
in the absence of the law of the state, what exists to direct or restrain the behav-
ior of the church? The religion decisions referred to as the "church autonomy"
cases provide us with the beginnings of the answer to this question: the
church's ethical-legal system.52 Even if a comprehensive alternative "legal"
system does not exist, which is often the case, an ethical system (derived from
theological principles) typically exists to direct and restrain behavior.5 3 In fact,
the existence of a well defined ethical-legal system has become part of the stan-
dard way in which courts define religion,54 and is even a component of the In-
ternal Revenue Code's definition of a "church. 55  Some legal theorists have
argued for generous exemptions for charitable activities of churches because
internal ethical restraints make churches good fiduciaries of the donations given
to them.56 Some exemptions are crafted specifically with a church's internal
governance in mind."
ing to independent commitments to serve their members and others. Particularly with respect to
churches, the coinciding of the state's interests and religious commitments does not detract from
the intrinsic value of religion. Such overlap simply reflects the fact that some of the things that
churches do, for reasons that are beyond the grasp of the state, may nevertheless comport with the
goals of the state when church and state are properly promoting the common good.
49 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970);
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
50 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
51 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
52 See generally Cover, supra note 42, at 8 (describing religious communities as norm-
generating communities).
53 See Charles Donahue, Jr., Comment on R.H. Helmholz, Conflicts Between Religious and
Secular Law, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 729, 730-31 (1991).
54 See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
55 MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
707 (1996).
56 Hansmann, supra note 17, at 875.
57 See, e.g., Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of N. & S. Am. v. Abrams, 618 N.Y.S.2d 504, 509
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). In Abrams, the court dealt with churches incorporated under the New York
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The church autonomy cases provide a rather dramatic illustration of le-
gal pluralism, albeit in the narrow field of ecclesiastical decisions. Flowing
from the fundamental independence of church from state, civil courts are not
considered competent to adjudicate religious questions, and so defer to religious
tribunals on matters of religious law. Consequently, on a host of issues involv-
ing internal decisions, the church autonomy doctrine allows multiple, non-state
legal systems to function. While I do not argue that exemptions provide analo-
gous "zones" of church autonomy, several aspects of the autonomy doctrine are
significant for understanding the connection between exemptions and the com-
mon good. The church autonomy cases show us that the state expects churches
to have their own legal systems, and those systems are expected to be connected
to their creedal and ethical teachings. Additionally, the cases view decision
making within these ethical-legal systems as essential to the process of self-
constitution and self-definition of churches. 58 And finally, the legal pluralism
that creates many "particular and plural" identities is assumed to foster stability
in the aggregate. 59
The Madisonian concept of a multiplicity of sects and factions, as un-
derstood in the nineteenth century, accepted a modest degree of legal pluralism
for non-state actors. Watson v. Jones,60 decided in 1871, is the first Supreme
Court decision to declare legal pluralism in the church-state area. After the
American Civil War, the national body of the Presbyterian Church (which had
opposed slavery) decided that pro-slavery southerners could not be part of the
church unless they repented of their sins.6' A schism between a pro-slavery
faction and anti-slavery faction at a local church raised the question: who owns
religious corporations statute that were required to get court approval for real estate transfers.
They also had to notify the New York Attorney General, unless they were organized as hierarchi-
cal polities. In holding that this did not involve religious discrimination, the court took into ac-
count the Attorney General's explanation for the hierarchical church notice exemption. "This
exemption is based on the theory that there are safeguards already built into the process under
[the religious corporations law] for hierarchical churches by requiring approval of the sale by the
top executive of the hierarchical church corporations before submission to the court." Id. (quot-
ing N.Y. Dep't of Law, Memorandum for the Governor, Bill Jacket, L. 1981, Ch. 244) (emphasis
added). The approval that had to be obtained by the church executive served to prevent abuses in
the transfer of real property; but since no such internal mechanism existed for non-hierarchical
churches, notice to the Attorney General was necessary. Id.
58 Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
59 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). The concept of legal pluralism, as
used in this article, is a very limited one. In some parts of the world, nations give ethnic or reli-
gious minorities autonomy for broad self-governance. Legal pluralism in those societies refers to
this model of expansive autonomy. That has never been the model in the United States, and is not
the model under consideration here. The United States Constitution does not permit the delega-
tion of state function to a church or the delegation of religious function to the state. To use the
vocabulary of Catholic social thought, while all institutions are called to promote the common
good, only the state has coercive authority to enforce public order.
60 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679.
61 Id. at 691.
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the church building? The appropriate tribunals within the national Presbyterian
Church found ownership in the anti-slavery faction. 62 The Court held that in
cases of hierarchical churches like this one, church decisions adjudicating
"questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" were
final and binding on civil courts.63
That churches have their own laws was considered completely natural.
64
The Court, pointing to the example of several large Protestant churches, noted
that each "has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be
found in their written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections
of precedents, in their usage and customs ... .,65 The Court clearly expected
the operation of those separate legal systems to promote the stability of society.
Indeed, a church that failed to promote such stability risked being viewed as
illegitimate: consider that, nearly contemporaneous with Watson, the Court re-
fused to acknowledge in any way the Mormon Church's claims regarding prop-
erty ownership, church governance, and autonomous ecclesiastical courts be-
cause of the repugnance of polygamy and the grave social harm it was thought
to pose.66
The question of the connection between autonomous decision making
and the common good continued to be a complex one throughout the twentieth
century. During most of that time, the deference to ecclesiastical decisions was
circumscribed by the expectation that such decisions would be free of "fraud,
collusion, and arbitrariness. 61 But in 1976, when a state court reinstated a de-
frocked bishop on the ground that the church arbitrarily had violated its own
laws, the Court rejected this level of accountability as too great an intrusion.68
The Court found that the state court had unconstitutionally substituted its own
interpretation of church law, displacing the proper church tribunal's interpreta-
tion.69 In the opinion, Justice Brennan allowed for church law to depart from
62 Id. at 692.
63 Id. at 727. For a vigorous debate on the value of the autonomy concept and its relation to
the common good, see Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy: Further Reflections About
What Is At Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 153 (2006-07) and Marci A. Hamilton, Church Autonomy Is
Not a Better Path to "Truth," 22 J.L. & RELIGION 215 (2006-07).
64 The legal pluralism of Watson, 80 U.S. at 679, is closely tied to the role of such autonomy
in the self-constitution of churches. The Court made clear that Americans have "[t~he right to
organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any
religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within
the association, and for the ecclesiastical government .... " Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-29.
65 Id. at 729.
66 See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1890), in which the Court held that Congress had the right to abrogate the corporate existence
of the Mormon church and confiscate its property. See also Edwin B. Firmage, Religion and the
Law: The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth Century, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 765 (1991).
67 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
68 Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
69 Id. at 720.
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the expectations of the state and society, eschewing even any requirement of
rationality.
70
To Justice Rehnquist, however, this seemed to be the kind of legal plu-
ralism that our system could not bear. Convinced that the civil courts could
expect rational decision making from church courts, he worried, in dissent, that
under the deference principle, civil courts permitted "arbitrary lawlessness.'
This may explain why three years later the Court gave its blessing to an alterna-
tive method of adjudicating religious disputes that allowed more aggressive civil
court intervention: the "neutral principles" approach.72 Under this approach,
courts may adjudicate church matters and even overturn a church's internal de-
cision as long as the court can do so without engaging religious principles.73 At
the same time the Court urges churches to use civil legal forms to give accurate
expression to their internal norms, it seems to be trying to ensure some kind of
minimal rationality with this more intrusive approach.
Despite the introduction of this "neutral principles" methodology, the
deference principle continues to govern most significantly in the area of church
employment decisions and has been embodied in the exemption doctrine known
as the "ministerial exception. 74 Under this exception, courts will not intrude on
hiring, firing, and promotion decisions regarding personnel whose jobs involve
core religious roles.75 Courts admit a total lack of competence under the Consti-
tution to review these internal church decisions.76 This results in a judge-made
exception to civil rights legislation, and in fact does provide a "zone" of auton-
omy. Sometimes there is an internal process available for the employee to seek
redress, but this does not appear to be the justification of the exception. Church
autonomy principles have also influenced the broad interpretation of the federal
statutory exemption that allows churches to discriminate in favor of their own
religions in employment, even with respect to "secular" positions that appear to
be disconnected from religious mission.7 7 For both the ministerial exception
and the broad statutory exemption allowing the exclusive hiring and retention of
70 "[E]cclesiastical decisions... are to be accepted as matters of faith, whether or not rational.
•.. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of 'fundamental fairness' or
impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cogni-
zance." Id. at 714-15.
71 See id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
73 Id. at 603 ("The method relies exclusively on objective, well established concepts of trust
and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts com-
pletely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice."). Id.
74 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985) (applying exception to claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see
also McClure v Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
75 See, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171.
76 See, e.g., id. at 1170.
77 See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
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co-religionists, the fundamental right of the church to define and constitute it-
self-especially when it decides who is in charge of religious functions-is pro-
tected, even at great cost to individual employees (or potential employees).78
While the law tolerates virtually complete autonomy in decision making
regarding clergy and other church employees, the courts have grown increas-
ingly uncomfortable with applying autonomy principles beyond these situations.
In the past, the autonomy principle protected churches from litigation that would
require searching inquiries into internal management practices, even though no
ecclesiastical decisions of an internal religious dispute were involved. That use
of autonomy seems to be diminishing, especially as more courts allow clergy
abuse victims to sue churches under the neutral principles approach.79 Further,
courts faced with unprecedented questions of legal pluralism appear less toler-
ant. For instance, some bankruptcy courts handling diocesan bankruptcies re-
fuse to recognize property ownership, as defined in Catholic canon law, in con-
nection with sex abuse tort claims.80
B. Establishment Clause: Walz v. Tax Commissioner 81
Some legislative exemptions are designed specifically for religious in-
stitutions. More commonly, churches benefit from legislative exemptions aimed
at a broader category of institutions, such as charitable or non-profit institutions.
Tax exemptions for the non-profit sector, an example of this second category,
quite explicitly preserve the distinction between civil society and the state and
embody the presumption that charities, including churches, promote the com-
mon good. A mechanism of accountability-revocation-is built into the tax
system.82 For other areas of law, doctrinal developments often function to limit
exemptions when they threaten the common good.
Religious and educational activities were historically included in the
common law's definition of "charity," because, like charity, they "redounded to
78 Churches are "free to: 'select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their
own disputes, and run their own institutions.' Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, I., concurring) (quoting
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1389 (1981)).
79 See generally Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Consti-
tutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219 (2000); Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and
Young People: Catholic and Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REv.
1031 (2003) [hereinafter Carmella, Protection].
80 See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 335 B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Or.
2005) (refusing to defer to canon law).
81 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
82 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 504 (2006) (providing for revocation of tax exempt status for political
lobbying); see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 673 (discussing revocation of tax exempt status).
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the benefit of an indefinite public." 83  In fact, even today most American
churches are considered to be "public charities." 84 Some might quarrel with this
designation because not all religious purposes are dedicated to the public's
benefit.85 But the record is clear that churches engage in numerous social wel-
fare endeavors, such as education, health care, and serving the poor, among
other things, which often supplement the work of both other charitable institu-
tions and the state. While recent debates in Congress and the courts have fo-
cused on the prudence and constitutionality of governmental funding for
churches in these social efforts, no one disputes the considerable extent to which
churches are generally involved in "charitable" works. 86 Thus, the current un-
derstanding is that churches, as charities, confer a public benefit, create social
stability, and relieve government of specific burdens. This rationale recognizes
that though many mediating institutions are formally considered to make up the
"private non-profit sector," in actuality they are non-state actors with public
purposes and public impacts.
The public benefit presumption provides the major historical and con-
temporary justification for tax exemptions and serves as the backdrop for the
Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commissioner, an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to a tax exemption for church property. 87  While tax exemptions for
church property have existed for hundreds of years, the current rationale for
such exemptions dates to the late nineteenth century when there was widespread
agreement that churches "serve to the advantage of both society in general and
the state in particular. They dispense 'social benefits' and discharge 'state bur-
dens." 88 Despite the persistence of this rationale, the Walz Court found the tax
exemption to be justified not by public benefits, but by an appropriate "benevo-
lent neutrality" of the state toward the church, by the institutional separation of
church and state, and by history.89 Yet the Court was well aware that the ex-
emption reflected the state's finding that all these groups "exist in a harmonious
83 JOHN WITrE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 192-93 (2000) (quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556
(Mass. 1867). Charity came to be defined as "any activity that redounded to 'the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their hearts or minds under the influence of edu-
cation or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting
them to establish themselves in life, by erecting or maintaining public buildings, or works or by
otherwise lessening the burdens of government."'
84 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 38, at 1203.
85 This requirement is not strictly administered. WITrE, supra note 83, at 208-10.
86 See generally IRA C. LuPU & ROBERT W. TUTrLE, THE STATE OF THE LAW 2006: LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZAT-
IONS, 2006 Roundtable on Religion & Soc. Welfare Policy. [hereinafter LuPu & TUTrLE, LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS].
87 397 U.S. 664 (1970). New York law made the exemption available to a broad range of
charitable, educational and other nonprofit institutions.
88 WrrrE, supra note 83, at 202.
89 Id. at 187.
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relationship to the community at large" and "foster its 'moral or mental im-
provement."' 90 The Court noted that it was constitutional for a legislature to
classify and exempt non-profits-including churches-that it found "useful,
desirable, and in the public interest."91 Because churches, along with other non-
profit institutions, have "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community
life, 92 the Court admitted it makes sense to ensure they are not "inhibited in
their activities," by taxation itself or by the means of enforcement by tax au-
thorities. 93 Thus, while the public benefit concept is not the basis for the deci-
sion, the concept is central to the decision's rationale: the state could extend
benevolent neutrality to churches and strive for separation from churches only
because churches could be trusted to promote the common good. The exemp-
tion was not unconstitutional "sponsorship" of religion, but rather a way to en-
able the state to coordinate non-profit mediating institutions, including churches,
as they play their unique roles in civil society.
In addition to its consideration of the general public benefits of tax ex-
emptions, the Court described the specific societal benefits of increased reli-
gious freedom and religious diversity. Justice Burger wrote that churches had
not abused tax exemptions by using them to concentrate money or consolidate
power, noting instead that the system had "operated affirmatively to help guar-
antee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief.,94 Justice Brennan's con-
currence emphasized that, in addition to contributing "to the well-being of the
community in a variety of nonreligious ways, 95 churches "uniquely contribute
to the pluralism of American society by their religious activities. ''96 While such
a focus on the society-state relationship might appear to dilute, or even substi-
tute for the analysis of the church-state relationship, the Walz Court understood
the tax exemption's function in both relationships. As institutions within civil
society, churches are like other mediating institutions, and the exemption allows
them greater freedom to mediate between the state, the market and the individ-
ual. It thus helps to preserve the independence of civil society from the state.97
But, as a constitutional matter, churches are never solely institutions of civil
90 Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
91 Id. at 673.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 672.
94 Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
95 Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 689. For an excellent treatment of the approaches of Burger and Brennan, see C.M.A.
Mc Cauliff, Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Complementary or Rival
Modes of Discourse? 24 CAL. W. L. REv. 287, 321-25 (1988).
97 See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemp-
tion, 23 J. CoRP. L. 585, 629 (1998) (proposing that a "sovereignty" view of the charitable sector
underlies the tax exemption, a perspective that "allows us to see how government simultaneously
defers to and restricts charitable activity," by keeping government out of the business of charities
and also keeping charities from petitioning the government for assistance).
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society. When it comes to churches as churches, the exemption preserves the
independence of the church from the state. In fact, Walz produced what would
later become the famous "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test (also penned
by Justice Burger):98 taxation of churches posed a far greater risk of state entan-
glement in the life of churches than did the exemption.99
Inasmuch as the justification for tax exemptions rests on the notion that
churches contribute to the common good, if a church behaves in ways incom-
patible with the common good, the exemption can be revoked. Indeed, "[a]
corollary to the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in
the law of trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or vio-
late established public policy."'o Citing this traditional rule, the Internal Reve-
nue Service revoked the exemption of a religiously affiliated college that had
racially discriminatory policies. In Bob Jones University v. United States,'0' the
Court upheld the IRS's action because the school violated the strong federal
commitment to racial equality in education. The Court further justified the ac-
tion because a school, and not a church (i.e., a worshipping community), was
affected.
0 2
Bob Jones raised concerns among legal pluralists, political theorists and
constitutional scholars that the state, in pursuit of its overarching norms, had
used law for heavy handed "moral education" and might begin to pursue an ag-
gressive agenda to evaluate the normative teachings of churches. 0 3 The IRS
had in fact attempted to prompt internal change at the school, and had been par-
tially successful when the school, in response to the first threat of revocation,
changed its policies from exclusion of non-whites to admission of non-whites,
but with a prohibition against interracial dating. The decision can be justified as
an example of the very traditional formulation for a tax exemption, one in effect
since at least 1602: that social benefit, not harm, is expected.' 04 Some minimal
98 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (providing that state action violates the Es-
tablishment Clause if it lacks a secular purpose, has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion, or results in excessive entanglement between church and state).
99 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-75. This same concern motivated Justice Burger to refuse to
uphold the exemption on the grounds that churches provide specific services or good works to
members and the larger community. Burger was concerned that such a "test" for the exemption
could give rise to conflicts between church and state. I suspect his concern was to avoid having
the state distinguish among different religious groups as to which ones provide sufficient benefit
to merit the exemption (and avoid the entanglement he feared).
10o Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).
101 461 U.S. 574.
102 See id. at 604 n.29.
103 See Cover, supra note 42, at 60-68; see also Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration,
and the State's Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA. L. REv. 1645 (2004)
(providing an insightful treatment of the government's assimilative pressures on religion).
104 See ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 55, at 719 (stating that under the Statute of Charitable
Uses, 1602, judges decided a use was charitable if it provided a public benefit and was otherwise
consistent with public policy).
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congruence between fundamental overarching norms and the norms of plural
and particular groups is properly expected, especially since, as the Court found,
the exemptions "encourage the development of private institutions that serve a
useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of
the same kind."105 In essence, an implied trust is attached to every tax exemp-
tion-with obligations owing to the public. There are constitutional limits to the
operation of this trust when it comes to the teachings of worship communities,
but the social fiduciary concept expresses the basic expectation, attached to
these exemptions, of a modicum of accountability.
The requirement of social accountability is also reflected in major doc-
trinal revisions restricting the creation of exemptions in several contexts outside
the tax area, such as charitable immunity and zoning protections. The presump-
tion of public benefit that sustained these doctrines has waned over the decades,
in large part due to the growing incongruence of that presumption with human
experience and legal developments. Charitable immunity from employee negli-
gence awards was originally intended to benefit charities (including churches)
and the wider society by protecting "trust funds, . . . [and] encourag[ing] ...
altruistic activity through private philanthropy, and ... reliev[ing] ... the gov-
ernment from the need to provide beneficent services."'16 But over time, chari-
table immunity became incompatible with developments in tort and insurance
law. 0 7 Courts began to conclude that to require liability insurance neither
threatened the survival of charities nor affected the "high service in the commu-
nity" that they perform. 10 8 Similarly, zoning protections in some states provided
churches with a presumption of public benefit in the land use context, on the
basis that religious land uses "are, in themselves, clearly in furtherance of the
public morals and general welfare."' 0 9 But this presumption of inherently bene-
ficial land use has given way, in many places, to more explicit judicial assess-
ments of the negative impacts caused by religious land use on surrounding
properties. 0
C. Free Exercise Clause: Wisconsin v. Yoder"'
We have seen that the church autonomy doctrine and the exemptions it
inspires can provide churches' separate ethical-legal systems substantial room to
105 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588.
106 Tonelli v. Bd. of Educ. of Wyckoff, 888 A.2d 433, 436 (N.J. 2005).
107 See, e.g., Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (discussing historical
development of charitable immunity in tort law).
108 Id. at 827-28 (discussing the impact of tort liability on charities).
109 Diocese of Rochester v. Brighton, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836-37 (N.Y. 1956).
t0 See Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First Amendment,
64 B.U. L. REV. 767, 776-83 (1985).
"'1 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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operate. We have also seen that the state, through legislative exemptions and
judicial review of those exemptions, can make substantive judgments about the
social good the exemption promotes. Now we turn to judicially created exemp-
tions, carved out of general legislation where compatible with the common
good.
Judicial creation of religious exemptions is not a modern phenomenon.
In 1813, in People v. Philips,"12 a New York court allowed a priest to remain
silent, and not testify as to the identity of a thief, where he learned of that iden-
tity through the thief s confession. 13 The New York Constitution protected
religious freedom "provided that the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices in-
consistent with the peace or safety of this state." ' 1 4 The court examined the so-
cial and ethical role of the sacrament of penance and found that an exemption-
here, a priest-penitent evidentiary privilege--could be reconciled with the
common good.
The Philips court, far from focusing on the dangers associated with al-
lowing priests to withhold testimony in violation of a legal duty, focused instead
on the social advantages of penance: the thief confessed and was reconciled to
his God and his church and community, thereby making it less likely that he
would steal again; and, in this case, the stolen goods were returned to the vic-
tims."15 With respect to the state's system of criminal justice, some of the same
goals-those that are cognizable by the state--of "reconciliation" to the com-
" munity and return of the goods were accomplished, but by different means. An
exemption from the general requirement of testifying was recognized, but rather
than lead to lawlessness, or threaten peace or safety, it allowed an alternative
ethical-legal system to benefit and stabilize the immediate community and wider
society.
More than a century and a half after Philips, the Supreme Court exhib-
ited a similar recognition of an alternative ethical-legal system and the congru-
ence of exemptions with the common good in Wisconsin v. Yoder.16 The
Court's opinion also points out the role of exemptions in sustaining the bound-
ary between civil society and the state, by enabling families and churches to
flourish in freedom and diversity.' 7 In Yoder, Amish parents claimed that send-
112 N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813, reproduced in MCCONNELL, GARVEY & BERG, supra note 8, at
103. 1 read this case as not an individual protection, but as institutional protection of the Catholic
Church. For the larger context of the case, see Walter L. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2004).
113 The priest was bound to silence by the seal of the confessional.
114 Philips, in MCCONNELL, GARVEY & BERG, supra note 8, at 107.
115 Id. at 108.
116 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Because Yoder makes survival of the Old Order Amish a central
concern, I consider it a case of institutional protection.
117 Id. at 213-14 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
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ing their children to school after the age of fourteen severely burdened their
ability to transmit their faith and way of life to their children and to sustain their
community. But unlike Walz, the Yoder court did not simply respect a legisla-
tive finding of social benefit; rather, it found actual benefit on the evidentiary
record." 8 Exempting the children from those last two years of required educa-
tion involved no "harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the
public safety, peace, order, or welfare."'" 9 Beyond this minimal consistency
with the common good, the exemption was found to promote the common good,
albeit in an alternative (Amish) manner.
[T]he Amish community has been a highly successful social
unit within our society, even if apart from the conventional
'mainstream.' Its members are productive and very law-abiding
members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its
usual modern forms. The Congress itself recognized their self-
sufficiency by authorizing exemptions .. .from the obligation
to pay social security taxes .... The Amish alternative to for-
mal secondary school education has enabled them to function
effectively in their day-to-day life ... and to survive and pros-
per in contemporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable
and highly self-sufficient community for more than 200 years in
this country. In itself this is strong evidence that they are capa-
ble of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citi-
zenship without compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade.
,,120
The Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to the Wisconsin
law. That standard provides that if religious claimants demonstrate that a law
burdens their religious belief or practice, the government must justify the burden
with a compelling interest that cannot be advanced by a less restrictive alterna-
tive. The Amish, while seeking freedom from "the hydraulic insistence on con-
formity to majoritarian standards,"1 2' were not asking for an exemption to allow
them to be lazy and uneducated. The Amish had their own method of work and
their own system of education, and allowing this system to flourish through ex-
emption allowed the state's goals of education to be realized-albeit in a differ-
ent way, for this particular community. In assessing the government's claim
that its legal requirements served a compelling interest, the Court made clear
that the government's interest must be one "not otherwise served."' 122 The Court
118 Id.. at 218.
119 Id. at 230.
120 Id. at 222, 225 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 217.
122 Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
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recognized that the state's interest in education could be properly served in this
way, by this community, according to its norms-yet outside the system estab-
lished by the state.
Like the Walz decision, Yoder provides us with a view of exemptions
that enable religious groups to promote the common good. Here we find an
exemption in harmony with the state's interest and society's needs. The Amish
may not share all the values of the larger culture, but their values do not threaten
to undermine the larger culture. They promote "informal learning-through-
doing; a life of 'goodness,' rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than
technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition . . . ."I" The
Amish way of life encompasses virtues that are highly prized by many of those
mediating institutions that help nurture the person and cultivate the citizen.
Thus, Yoder, like Walz, reflects an appreciation of the role of exemptions in
sustaining the distinction between civil society and the state, and of the benefi-
cial and stabilizing tendencies of mediating institutions like families, churches
and charities, thereby expressing the quintessential Madisonian paradox that
stability and social health can be achieved through freedom, not law. And like
Walz, Yoder also implicitly celebrates the legal pluralism the exemption en-
abled.
To be sure, doctrinal developments have made exemptions harder to es-
tablish and sustain. The church autonomy area has seen calls for greater ac-
countability and the rise of the "neutral principles" approach has made it easier
to impose overarching norms upon churches. 124 Courts are also less likely than
before to entertain presumptions of public benefit from church activities. 125 But
few were prepared for the sweeping imposition of a system of near-total ac-
countability that occurred in 1990. The Court, in Employment Division v.
Smith, 126 did not overrule Yoder, but virtually eliminated the possibility of
judge-made exemptions from otherwise general laws. 27 The Smith Court re-
jected a claim for an exemption from drug laws for Native American sacramen-
tal use of peyote by holding that the compelling interest test is not applicable to
most neutral, general laws. 128 To justify the rejection of the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review, Justice Scalia wrote, "[a]ny society adopting such a system [of
exempting religious objectors when the law fails to serve a compelling interest]
would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or sup-
press none of them."' 129 A regime of judicial exemptions is a "system in which
123 Id. at 211.
124 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
125 See Reynolds, supra note 110.
126 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
127 Id. at 881.
128 Id. at 879-80.
129 Id. at 888.
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each conscience is a law unto itself."' 3 ° For the Smith Court, legislatures, not
courts, are the appropriate bodies for determining the wisdom of exemptions.1
3
'
In response to Smith, Congress saw fit to return the task of exemption
creation to the judiciary, in certain contexts, by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)132 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). 133 These federal statutes (and some state counterparts)
restore the Yoder approach in some categories of cases. But if a legislature de-
cides not to include exemptions for churches, and no statutory recourse exists
under RFRA or RLUIPA, churches are virtually without constitutional protec-
tion when neutral, general laws burden their religious practices. After Smith, the
temptation for states to impose their overarching norms on the institutions of
civil society--especially churches-is a strong one indeed.
III. DEVELOPING A UNIFIED "COMMON GOOD" APPROACH
UNDER BOTH RELIGION CLAUSES
Judicial interpretation and application of the Religion Clauses and relig-
ion-protective statutes fulfills an important social role in regulating the relation-
ship between the legal pluralism of churches in civil society and the overarching
norms of the state as those norms are expressed in generally applicable laws and
doctrines. But courts and legislatures should not assume that an antagonistic
relationship exists between the norms of churches and the norms of the state.
As is evident in Watson, Walz and Yoder, churches, in their plural and particu-
laristic ways, might very well advance some of those overarching norms when
their own internal ethical-legal systems are allowed to guide their behavior.
Recognizing this possibility requires the state to recognize its own limitations,
vis-A-vis both churches and civil society, and to acknowledge that exemptions,
properly evaluated and tailored, enable responsible freedom, rather than law-
lessness or abuse.
The concept of the common good mediates this comparison between
competing norms. Because of the focus on the "compelling interest test" in free
exercise discourse, we tend to equate the state's interest with the general wel-
fare. Yet, "the common good" is a broader category that gives due considera-
tion to the role of the institutions of civil society and focuses on social condi-
tions as they affect human development. Thus, "the common good" cannot be
identified with the good of the state, or of any one institution, or even the
130 Id. at 890.
131 Id.
132 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000). RFRA applies only to federal law after it was
held unconstitutional as applied to the states, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Twelve states have passed "mini-RFRAs." For a complete listing, see MCCONNELL, GARVEY &
BERG, supra note 8, at 161.
133 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
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"greatest good of the greatest number,"'' 34 for these concepts ignore "how this
overall sum [of welfare] is distributed among the members of the society.' 35
The common good refers to "the securing of a whole ensemble of material and
other conditions that tend to favour the realization, by each individual in the
community, of his or her personal development.' ' 136 The common good has
been described as consisting "chiefly in the protection of the rights, and in the
performance of the duties of the human person."'' 37 But the common good also
calls for a just, peaceful and stable society comprised of strong mediating insti-
tutions. All institutions work together to provide the political, economic and
social conditions that enable the full flourishing of the human person. 38 The
focus of the common good on all institutions of civil society (and not only the
state) prevents us from becoming too enamored with either individual rights,
disconnected from context, or a collectivized good that ignores the moral
agency of the human person. 139
The common good is not a fixed concept. While its unchanging objec-
tive always focuses on the flourishing of the human person in society, the defi-
nition of the common good is "concretize[d] in historical, time-bound goals"
and is "constantly revis[ed] and reconceiv[ed] in accordance with the particular
needs of the time."' 14 And it is reached only through deliberation. 14 1 Thus, the
specific goals of legislation, or a particular interest of society can give expres-
sion to an aspect of the common good, insofar as it addresses the creation or
reform of specific political, economic and social conditions. The lawmaking
activity of the state, framed in terms of the "state's interest" or "society's gen-
eral welfare," is capable of promoting the common good. Exemptions give a
particular kind of expression to the role of mediating institutions, and invite
consideration of the ways in which the conduct of the exempt institution will
affect social conditions.
Issues involving exemptions arise under two different clauses of the
First Amendment. Those granted by a legislature might be challenged as viola-
tions of the Establishment Clause, as was done in Walz. And where the legisla-
134 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 154 (1980).
135 DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 7 (2002).
136 FINNIS, supra note 134, at 154.
137 Declaration, supra note 23, at 683-84.
138 The common good "embraces the sum of those conditions of social life by which individu-
als, families and groups can achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way."
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II
199, 284 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 1966).
139 See generally Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as Subversion: Local Power, Legal Norms,
and the Liberal State, 2 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 277 (2005) [hereinafter Vischer, Subversion].
140 Louis Dupre, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 172, 191 (R. Bruce Douglass & David Hollen-
bach eds., 1994).
141 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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ture has not granted an exemption, a religious claimant might ask a court to cre-
ate an exemption as a mandate of the Free Exercise Clause, as was done in
Yoder. While this second alternative was severely narrowed after the 1990
Smith decision, Congress responded to Smith with RFRA and RLUIPA, which
provided causes of action to challenge federal laws, laws governing state pris-
ons, and laws that affect religious land uses. These statutory provisions will be
discussed in connection with the free exercise jurisprudence.
In this section, I describe two separate exemption jurisprudences (one
under each clause) and locate in each the connection between exemptions and
the common good. Since that connection already exists in each body of prece-
dent, I propose to unify the separate analyses so that one approach applies
across the board. Further, I suggest that this inquiry should apply differently to
the three main categories of exemptions: those that enable churches to constitute
themselves, those that provide relief from financial obligations, and those that
facilitate church participation in a great variety of human services. These cate-
gories make possible a more nuanced understanding of society's proper expecta-
tions of churches. Under these categories social accountability is lowest when
exemptions enable churches to constitute themselves and is highest when
churches receive financial benefits and serve those outside of their membership
bodies. In the section to follow, I will further refine the analysis by taking into
account situations in which normative standards remain contested.
This proposal is not intended to expand the role for courts and legisla-
tures in evaluating the conduct of churches. As we see from a brief overview of
Watson, Walz and Yoder, courts and legislatures already evaluate-sometimes
explicitly, more often implicitly and indirectly-the relationship between ex-
emptions and the common good. The proposal simply offers guidance and con-
straints for an evaluative process that already occurs.
A. Exemptions: Two, Now Three, Distinct Bodies of Law
Yoder's extraordinary judicial sensitivity to the common good argument
showed that the Free Exercise Clause, and the "compelling interest test" that
enabled exemptions under that clause, were capable of capturing the church-
society connection. The Yoder Court found that an exemption that removed a
burden on religious practice was compatible with the state's goals. But post-
Yoder applications of this test obscured the connection between exemptions and
the common good because the Court over-emphasized the test as a "weighing"
of opposing interests. When the "weight" of the burden to religious practice
was measured against the "weight" of the state's interest, an exemption (to alle-
viate the burden on religious practice) would be granted only if the state's inter-
est was not sufficiently "heavy." Given the significance attached to most laws,
simply by virtue of a legislature's decision to address a given issue, it was very
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difficult for a religious claim to "outweigh" the state's interest. 142 Such a focus
on balancing the interests obscured the more appropriate question: whether a
religious exemption might be compatible with, or indeed might even promote, a
state interest of a most compelling nature.
143
The compelling interest test came to be understood as setting forth
rights in opposition to the state's interest, which included a "weighing" of an-
tagonistic claims, so that exemptions from law unavoidably undermined the
state's goals. 144 With increased litigation from individuals with sui generis reli-
gious beliefs,145 courts began to assume that religious claims in general neces-
sarily conflicted with those of the larger society, and that religious conduct
tended to be antisocial and destabilizing."46 By the 1980s, we find the Court
emphasizing the irrational and incomprehensible aspects of religion for indi-
viduals and for churches.147 At the same time, the protection of the common
good of society came to be identified exclusively with the state's role. By the
time of the Smith decision, the Court associated the exemption mechanism of
the compelling interest test with lawlessness, not stability or promotion of the
common good. Rather than repair the test by retrieving the underlying connec-
tion between exemptions and the common good, the Smith Court simply jetti-
soned it. The dissent, however, perceived that connection, and found it signifi-
cant.
The dissenters in Smith retrieved Yoder's common good argument, and
found that the peyote exemption and the state's anti-drug goals were compati-
ble. 1 48 Beyond the argument that the exemption would not thwart the federal
war on drugs because there was no trafficking in peyote, they justified the ex-
emption on the grounds that it actually promoted important state goals. Looking
carefully at the reasons why more than half of the states had granted peyote ex-
emptions for Native Americans, they found that the sacramental use of peyote
142 See the cases discussed in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-86. Justice Scalia
concluded from these cases that "[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate." Id. at 878-79.
143 Justice Scalia likened the balancing test to comparing the length of a line to the weight of a
rock. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (Scalia, J., concurring).
144 Yoder characterized the compelling interest test as a weighing, but did not allow the meta-
phor to obscure the connection between the exemption and the state's interest in education.
145 See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695-97 (1986).
146 See cases cited in Smith, 494 U.S. at 888-89 (what Justice O'Connor refers to as the "parade
of horribles" in her concurring opinion.) Id. at 902.
147 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (finding that "religious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection"); see also Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
148 Smith, 494 U.S. at 908-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972)).
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promoted community stability and family life, and reduced drug and alcohol
abuse. 149
After Smith, and no doubt in reaction to it, we see some glimpses of the
common good argument. Some state courts employed their state constitutions
to retain the compelling interest test, and some of those admitted the connection
between the exemption and the state's goals. 150 In fact, some courts noted that
the state's goals were promoted more effectively by the church's conduct than
by compliance with the state's laws. 15 Similarly, some interpretations of RFRA
and RLUIPA make the common good connection.' 52 These courts have steered
away from the notion of "weighing" oppositional interests and have seen a har-
mony of compatible interests when the state's goal is promoted in the religious
actor's own way.
In fact, RFRA, which directly references Yoder as an interpretive guide,
and RLUIPA seem to offer the best vehicle for retrieving any sense of a connec-
tion between exemptions and the common good. Chief Justice Roberts's recent
opinion interpreting RFRA, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
149 Smith, 494 U.S. at 907, 914-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The carefully circumscribed ritual context in which respondents used peyote is
far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of unlaw-
ful drugs. The Native American Church's internal restrictions on, and super-
vision of its members' use of peyote substantially obviate the State's health
and safety concerns. Moreover, just as in Yoder, the values and interests of
those seeking a religious exemption in this case are congruent, to a great de-
gree, with those the State seeks to promote through its drug laws. Not only
does the church's doctrine forbid nonreligious use of peyote; it also generally
advocates self-reliance, familial responsibility, and abstinence from alcohol.
Far from promoting the lawless and irresponsible use of drugs, Native Ameri-
can Church members' spiritual code exemplifies values that Oregon's drug
laws are presumably intended to foster.
Id. (emphasis added).
15o See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Freedom: An Emerg-
ing Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 279-81 (1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
151 See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (silver reflecting tape on
slow-moving Amish vehicles promoted safety goals even more effectively than the state's orange-
triangle requirement).
152 See, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1995) (Sikh children's offer to
sew ceremonial knife into sheath satisfied school's no-knife policy); Elsinore Christian Ctr. v.
City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Cal. 2003) (church building plans would curb
urban blight, so town did not have to deny conditional use permit); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v.
Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1228 (D. Cal. 2002) (church building
plans would curb urban blight, so town did not have to take the property by eminent domain);
Campos v. Coughlin 854 F. Supp. 194, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (prisoner's offer to wear religious
beads under clothing satisfied the prison's concern that beads could be used in gang identifica-
tion); W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77, 78-79 (D.D.C.
1994) (church soup kitchen could operate so long as it did not create negative impacts on sur-
rounding neighborhood).
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Do Vegetal (UDV), 153 spoke in terms of explicit compatibility between the reli-
gious exemption and the promotion of the greater social good. In UDV, a small
sect claimed that its use of an illegal drug for sacramental purposes was pro-
tected under RFRA. The federal government claimed that uniform enforcement
of the drug laws was necessary, and that the current absence of any legislative
exemption was sufficient proof. Rather than describe the process as a "weigh-
ing" of antagonistic interests, Chief Justice Roberts remarked that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause interpretation RFRA was intended to replicate "scrutinized the
asserted harm [to state interests] of granting specific exemptions to particular
religious claimants."'' 54 Specifically describing the Yoder decision, he empha-
sized several times how the Court carefully examined not only the government's
interests, but also "'the impediment to those objectives that would flow from
recognizing the claimed Amish exemption."",155 In that case, he said, Wisconsin
had to demonstrate "'with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest.
. . would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.""156 In
UDV the Court emphasized that because "'context matters, '"' 57 the state must
demonstrate a causal connection between the exemption and social harm.'58
The case rejected the automatic assumption that religious exemptions stand in
opposition to the common good, instead placing the onus on the state to specify
harms that would warrant the denial of the exemption. Because the underlying
values of Yoder continue to be vibrant, the UDV decision helps to lay the
groundwork for a retrieval of Yoder's sensitivity to the common good argument,
and contains the seeds for rectifying the inadequacies of the Smith approach.
While free exercise and statutory claims ask courts to grant an exemp-
tion, the Establishment Clause is invoked when a religious exemption has al-
ready been legislatively granted and is being challenged as an unwarranted
"benefit" to religion. For the most part, however, legislative exemptions are not
considered "benefits" under the usual establishment tests 59 because they are
153 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 1 have argued elsewhere that RFRA was unconstitutional because the
articulation of a standard of review under the Free Exercise Clause is a judicial task. See Eugene
Gressman and Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 65 (1996). The article argued for a judicial return to the compelling interest test in free exer-
cise interpretation. In the present article, I do not advocate a simple return to that test. I do, how-
ever, appreciate that the statutory interpretations of the compelling interest test in RFRA and
RLUIPA, as was the case in Yoder, are capable of showing compatibility between exemptions and
law.
154 UDV, 546 U.S. at 431.
155 Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
156 Id.
157 Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)).
158 The Court pointed out that the text of the federal drug law at issue "contemplates that ex-
empting certain people from its requirements would be 'consistent with the public health and
safety."' Id. at 432-33.
159 I refer here to the "Lemon" and "endorsement" tests. The Lemon test requires a secular
legislative purpose, a primary effect that does not advance or inhibit religion, and no excessive
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understood to promote not religion, but religious freedom. 16° Indeed, because
the Smith Court deemed legislatures superior to courts for crafting religious ex-
emptions, legislative exemptions are now practically the "only available vehicle
for honoring Free Exercise values" under the First Amendment. 61  This does
not mean, of course, that all exemptions are acceptable; some might "devolve
into 'an unlawful fostering of religion.' ' 162 Therefore, the Court has developed,
over time, several factors for distinguishing between permissible exemptions
that promote free exercise and impermissible ones that provide "unjustifiable
awards of assistance."
163
Given the primacy of free exercise values, then, it is not surprising that
religious exemptions in legislation must be shown to lift state-created burdens
on religious exercise. This is illustrated vividly in Corp. of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos,164 a case rooted in autonomy doctrine. The federal employment discrimi-
nation statute in question allowed churches to discriminate in favor of their own
members, regardless of the religious or secular nature of the employment. A
janitor was fired by his church employer because he was no longer a member in
good standing. He challenged that provision of the law as a violation of the
Establishment Clause on the grounds that his job was secular, and that churches
should be subject to anti-discrimination laws with respect to secular jobs. Jus-
tice White justified this exemption wholly on religious freedom grounds, and in
doing so, extricated it from the snares of Lemon's purpose and effect prongs.
He wrote that the exemption fulfills a proper secular purpose because it "allevi-
ate[s] significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organi-
zations to define and carry out their religious missions."' 165 He further found
that the exemption did not unconstitutionally advance religion "simply because
it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to
have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence."' 166 Though
Justice O'Connor criticized this distinction, 167 it is fully consistent with the no-
church-state entanglement. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The "endorsement test"
prohibits the state from endorsing or disapproving of religion in a way that makes religion rele-
vant to one's standing in the political community. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
160 DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 108 (2003).
161 Id. at 133-134.
162 Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)).
163 Id. at 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
164 Id. at 327 (majority opinion).
165 Id. at 335.
166 Id. at 337 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167 Id. at 347. Justice O'Connor thought it would be helpful to admit that an exemption ad-
vances religion, but then to decide which ones are constitutional accommodations and which ones
are "unjustifiable awards of assistance." Id. at 348.
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tion that exemptions give churches freedom to develop their plural and particu-
lar identities in civil society. Justice Brennan's concurrence made even more
explicit the fundamental autonomy concerns expressed in the exemption, noting
that a church "defines itself' when it "[d]etermin[es] that certain activities are in
furtherance of [its] religious mission, and that only those committed to that mis-
sion should conduct them .... ,,68
In addition to an exemption's connection to the promotion of free exer-
cise, several other factors are significant in determining the permissibility of
exemptions under the Establishment Clause: the burdens an exemption might
impose on non-beneficiaries; the possibility of sectarian discrimination arising
from the exemption; and the possibility that an exemption will override other
important interests. In the recent decision of Cutter v. Wilkinson,169 Justice
Ginsburg applied this multi-factored approach to exemptions under the Estab-
lishment Clause, and, like Chief Justice Roberts in UDV, suggested an explicit
connection between exemptions and the common good. In Cutter, prison ad-
ministrators challenged the portion of RLUIPA applicable to prisoners as a fa-
cial violation of the Establishment Clause. What is different here is that the
challenge is not to a specific exemption, like a tax exemption, but instead to a
statute providing a process by which a religious claimant might gain an exemp-
tion. The Court thus takes the opportunity to see the free exercise values em-
bedded in RLUIPA, and further, to see the connections between exemptions and
their social impact.
In upholding the statute, Justice Ginsburg draws from prior establish-
ment precedent concerning exemptions and other types of accommodations to
distill a comprehensive inquiry regarding social impact.1 70  Concluding that
"[w]e have no cause to believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appro-
priately balanced way,"1 71 she sets out the need to assess broader impacts.
Courts specifically "must take adequate account of the burdens a requested ac-
commodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries .... Further, the exemption
must not violate basic denominational neutrality. 7 3 And finally, "[a]n accom-
168 Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
169 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
170 Id.; see also, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet 512 U.S. 687, 692
(1994); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 13 (1989).
171 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.
172 Id. at 720. See also Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 24 (tax burdens flowed to non-beneficiaries);
Thornton, 472 U.S. at 710 (Sabbath observers were protected "over all other interests...").
173 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723-24. The requirement that RLUIPA be "administered neutrally
among different faiths" does not mean that all religions must receive the exemption, but that all
religions that suffer the same burdens must receive the exemption. Id. at 720. As Professor
Conkle explains, "[T]he government can grant one exemption but not another that is arguably
similar as long as there is a distinction that is reasonable in terms of the relative strength of the
government's secular interests and the relative harm to those interests that a religious exemption
would cause." CONKLE, supra note 160, at 140.
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modation must be measured so that it does not override other significant inter-
ests." 174 While the government's interest in this portion of RLUIPA is often
cast in terms of prison administration, the Court makes clear that it is more ac-
curately understood as the larger "social" interest in "discipline, order, safety
and security" within the prison society. 175 Thus, the impacts on increasingly
broad social categories are relevant: the beneficiaries, the non-beneficiaries,
other religious groups, and the wider society with any significant interest in the
outcome.
Most Establishment Clause exemption cases involve religion-only ex-
emptions. For broad exemptions that benefit churches as part of a larger group
of non-state institutions, the establishment concerns are considerably lessened.
In fact, when an establishment is found in the context of a religion-only exemp-
tion, an appropriate remedy is to broaden the exemption to include non-religious
counterparts. 176 Broadly applicable exemptions, like the tax exemption in Walz,
are consistent with the many different understandings of establishment clause
neutrality. 177 They are also fully consistent with promoting the independence
and pluralism of civil society.
Thus, the current Establishment Clause jurisprudence encourages legis-
latures to craft broad exemptions that include churches as beneficiaries. And
when legislatures craft religion-only exemptions, those exemptions must pro-
mote free exercise. Further, it appears that even religious exemptions that could
be said to lift burdens might still be violations of the Establishment Clause, if
they place disproportionate burdens on those who do not benefit, allow sectarian
discrimination, or thwart other overriding societal interests. 178 Here the exemp-
tions become unjustifiable awards of assistance, impermissible benefits to the
church rather than a "vehicle for honoring free exercise values." 179 It remains to
be seen whether Cutter's contextual analysis will have the effect of redirecting
lower courts' interpretations of exemptions generally, or whether it will be more
limited in scope.
B. Unifying the Distinct Bodies of Law
UDV and Cutter contain the seeds for regenerating and uniting the
common good argument in both the free exercise and establishment contexts.
174 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.
175 Id.
176 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344, 356-58 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. 1.
177 Neutrality has many different meanings. It can refer to: "evenhanded" aid given without
reference to religion, benevolent neutrality (as in no sponsorship and no interference), strict neu-
trality as between religion and nonreligion, or the neutral effect of an accommodation that does
not make a religious choice more attractive.
178 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.
179 CONKLE, supra note 160, at 133-34.
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But why is that important? Why should we care whether exemptions are given
similar treatment under both clauses and under the religion-protective statutes?
A unified inquiry is appropriate for institutional reasons and for substantive rea-
sons.
A unified approach to exemptions calls on courts and legislatures to be
involved in exemptions under both clauses. The Smith Court found courts in-
competent to assess the compatibility of exemptions and the common good, as it
involves what many consider to be "political" balancing. But this institutional
preference creates a distortion in the assessment that legislatures make. Right
now, there is virtually no way to seek a judicial exemption from a neutral law of
general applicability unless RFRA or RLUIPA (or a state counterpart) applies.
On the other hand, a legislative exemption is always subject to challenge under
the Establishment Clause. The net effect is an imbalance: courts have the power
to strike exemptions, but not to mandate them. This discourages legislative de-
liberation concerning exemptions and encourages legislatures to assert govern-
mental norms against churches, thereby ignoring the very task of political bal-
ancing the Smith Court charged them with. Contrary to the impression left by
the New York Times series noted at the start of this article, legislatures do say
"no" to churches that seek exemptions. 180 In a system that recognizes the possi-
ble compatibility of exemptions and the common good, courts need to be able to
invalidate exemptions that cause social disruption and to mandate exemptions
that produce religious freedom, social stability and public benefit. 81 Legisla-
tures can obviously get it wrong either way. Thus, a judicial check is necessary
either way.
Moving from the institutional reasons for a unified common good ar-
gument under both clauses, we turn to the substantive rationale. Why is it nec-
essary, as a matter of religious freedom and nonestablishment, to look to the
impact of a church exemption on the common good? Certainly one could argue
that this takes the focus off the purposes of the Religion Clauses-primarily
promoting voluntary religious choice-and threatens to give the state carte
blanche to limit freedom whenever it claims that religious exercise is inconsis-
tent with its goals or society's needs. This would dilute the protection for inher-
ent freedoms. Americans tend to consider rights to be most robust when un-
popular groups with antisocial conduct are protected from state intervention,
180 See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006),
cert. denied, 2007 WL 1494780 (U.S.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007); Catholic Charities of Sacramento v.
Sacramento, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004); O'Ryan Johnson, Catholic
Charities Hands Over Adoptions to Agency, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 29, 2006, at News 5; Cicero
Estrella, Catholic Charities Scaling Back its Role in Adoption Services, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3,
2006, at B 1.
18l See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
But cf Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465
(1999).
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without regard to social impact. 182 We boldly proclaim that "it's none of the
state's business."
But when it comes to exemptions, it is the state's business because ex-
emptions remove religious conduct from the reach of laws properly within the
state's jurisdiction. When government legislates, adjudicates, or regulates
within its scope of competence, it must evaluate the social consequences of any
exemption under consideration. Now, that does not mean that religious exemp-
tions only protect "safe" conduct. Many exemptions protect what could be con-
sidered antisocial, disturbing, destabilizing, even harmful conduct. But, if we
look closely at these exemptions, we see they are usually justified because either
so few people are in a position to take advantage of them, or the impacts are so
well contained that there is little or no harm. 183 In these cases, a narrow reli-
gious freedom and limited legal pluralism can still be consistent with the com-
mon good, and even radically divergent values can contribute to the deliberative
process that defines the common good.
The case for church exemptions that have more than a minor or well
contained impact requires a more developed common good argument. Assum-
ing the legislation is valid, an exemption for a class of activity otherwise cov-
ered by legislation (protecting either a group of institutions in civil society or
churches alone) can be justified only if it does not thwart the common good.
Some commentators focus on the structural aspects of the common good, argu-
ing that freedom for the institutions of civil society is an intrinsic good.' 84 But
in the exemption context, it is simply not enough to consider the increase in
diversity and pluralism that exemptions enable, for this argument excuses too
much. Under such an argument, any exemption would be presumed to be a so-
cial benefit, and we know that is simply not true. Obviously, an exemption from
criminal law to allow religiously motivated murder would never be tolerated.
Thus, a simple appeal to the contribution of exemptions to pluralism and bound-
ary maintenance between civil society and the state is insufficient.
There is no way to avoid substantive judgments about the social im-
pacts, positive and negative, of churches. A richer and more accurate view of
the common good goes beyond structural "boundary maintenance" and includes
this substantive evaluation. In the context of exemptions, courts and legislatures
182 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
183 See, e.g., Alicia Novak, Comment, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to State-
Compelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1101 (2005).
Congress responded to Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (which held that the
Free Exercise Clause was not violated by a military prohibition on yarmulkes) by exempting
religious headgear like yarmulkes from the military prohibition, in part because so few men would
make use of the exemption that it would not seriously compromise the necessary esprit de corps.
Similarly, the peyote exemption from drug laws for Native Americans passed by Congress in
1994 was justified in large part because there is no trafficking of peyote. 42 U.S.C. § 1996(a)
(1994).
184 See, e.g., Kathleen Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Les-
sons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633.
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have always made such evaluations, and will continue to do so. In the church
autonomy cases, drawing the line between appropriate autonomy and appropri-
ate regulation tacitly involves such an assessment. The burden-compelling in-
terest test invites such an assessment, even though it was rarely framed in those
terms. Even the Smith decision created a sweeping presumption that religious
exemptions thwart the common good (unless legislatures determine otherwise).
Finally, the Establishment Clause goal of preventing unwarranted religious
privilege invites such an assessment as well, because an exemption that benefits
a church at the extreme expense of society is precisely the measure of "favorit-
ism." Why not make sure the assessment is done explicitly, with safeguards in
place?
I propose the following standard, and then demonstrate how it might be
applied in three categories of exemption below. This approach would inform
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause analyses, as well as the RFRA
and RLUIPA interpretations, and apply whether a church was requesting a court
to order an exemption from a general law or whether a party was challenging an
exemption as an establishment. It should also inform the inquiry of a legislature
faced with exemption requests. First, we make sure the exemption removes a
burden to religious exercise. Second, we determine the ethical-legal systems
that function in place of the state's law. Third, we ask the nature of the exemp-
tion's impact on a) the state's law, b) any specific relevant societal interests, and
c) the common good. These are different things, but we need to assess them
individually and in relationship to each other. The common good is "the totality
of goods that create the conditions in which persons flourish,"'' 85 so a given
piece of legislation might advance one aspect of the common good, while an
exemption advances another; a law might promote the interests of one slice of
society (the rich, let's say), while an exemption might advance the interests of
another (the poor--or vice versa). And finally, we consider the conduct of the
state and other institutions of civil society-for instance, whether other non-
state actors can be depended upon to promote the goals of the law-to make
sure we have a complete picture of the exemption's impact. 186
C. Applying a Unified Standard to Distinct Categories of Exemptions
Exemptions, whether judicial or legislative, can be divided into three
general categories. First are those exemptions that enable churches to define
185 Carmella, A Catholic View, supra note 27, at 266.
186 There might be a concern that using the same "common good" inquiry for judicial exemp-
tions and legislative exemptions would collapse the distinction between constitutionally mandated
exemptions (under a Yoder-reading of the Free Exercise Clause) and permissible exemptions
(under the Establishment Clause). The distinction will not collapse, however, because there re-
main basic differences in institutional roles. Legislatures are free to grant exemptions broadly,
beyond church beneficiaries, as in Walz, and also are free to grant religious exemptions as long as
there is a nexus to religious freedom. Courts, on the other hand, can insist that church claimants
demonstrate a clear warrant for an exemption.
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and constitute themselves. Like the ministerial exception, and the employment
discrimination exemption as interpreted by the Amos Court, these exemptions
echo the church autonomy cases going all the way back to Watson v. Jones.
Next are those exemptions that give churches freedom from financial obliga-
tions. Like the tax exemptions of Walz, these exemptions echo the early under-
standing that churches, like all charities, are social fiduciaries and are expected
to provide public benefit. Finally, certain exemptions give churches freedom
from state regulation, particularly in the delivery of a numerous health, welfare,
educational and social services. Like the exemption in Yoder, 187 these exemp-
tions allow churches to carry out important roles in society according to their
own understanding and governed by their own internal standards. In contrast to
the alternative educational system considered in Yoder, however, such services
are usually provided broadly to beneficiaries outside the church, which height-
ens demands for social accountability. Of course all three of these categories
often overlap, but they provide rough lines to help guide us.
1. Exemptions for Self-Definition and Self-Constitution
Exemptions that allow groups to define and constitute themselves pro-
tect a fundamental principle of freedom for many mediating institutions within
civil society. This is the "particular and plural"' 88 of the civil society, in which
numerous diverse groups are free to define their memberships and missions.
For churches specifically, these exemptions further a limited autonomy on ec-
clesiastical matters and the independence of church and state. These exemp-
tions also signify the acceptance of a modest legal pluralism: the alternative
normative systems that govern decisions about membership, employment, and
the like enable the functioning of non-state legal systems. Those affected are
considered to have impliedly consented to be bound by church rules and gov-
ernance. Thus, decisions and doctrines about employment-hiring, firing,
moral standards, and the like-are generally immune from state intervention. 89
The state's primary concern with this category of exemption is in ensur-
ing that some normative standards function in place of its law. The substantive
compatibility between the church's norms and the state's norms are far less
relevant precisely because these autonomy-based exemptions are intended to
allow for normative diversity and pluralism in civil society. These exemptions
ensure the boundary between church and state, as well as between civil society
and the state; they also allow for diverse voices to participate in deliberations
over the common good, particularly as churches offer prophetic witness on a
host of controversial social issues. The independence also protects the role of
187 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972).
188 Rosenblum & Post, Introduction, supra note 304, at 3-4.
189 State labor laws often apply, however, to religious institutions. See Brady, supra note 184,
at 1658-62.
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churches as mediating institutions.190 Decisionmakers considering exemptions
in this category focus more closely on the structural, as opposed to the substan-
tive, common good. The ministerial exception, for instance, protects churches
even when they make arbitrary and deceptive employment decisions because the
critical goal is to disable the state from deciding who runs a church. 191
But not all autonomy-based exemptions serve the boundary function
without regard to substantive effects. Autonomy is also the basis for exemp-
tions that protect sacramental practices and other core religious practices, such
as the Native American peyote exemption and exemptions from abuse and ne-
glect statutes for Christian Scientist parents who use spiritual healing when their
children are sick. Such practices are just as central to self-definition and self-
constitution as are decisions regarding employment. These exemptions, and the
alternative normative systems that govern in the space created by them, are scru-
tinized from a substantive perspective. Peyote use has been recognized as hav-
ing stabilizing tendencies in those communities that partake of it.192 And ex-
emptions for spiritual healing have been justified by an entire system of alterna-
tive healing, complete with "nurse practitioners" certified by the Christian Sci-
ence Church. 93 Several states, however, have held parents criminally culpable
for the deaths of their children, 94 and a handful of states have repealed the ex-
emptions in light of these deaths. 195 Critics have called for the repeal of these
exemptions in each state, especially since they are no longer required as a condi-
tion of federal funds. 1
96
Even in the employment area, a doctrinal shift toward greater social ac-
countability (and a narrowing of autonomy) may be taking place. There is a
circuit split on the issue whether the ministerial exception should be replaced by
190 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on "No-Harm"
Grounds, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1375, 1377 (noting that virtues emerging from theological and ethi-
cal conviction are more authentic and have more authority over members than if those same vir-
tues were enforced by civil law).
91 See generally Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
192 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193 See, e.g., Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the
American Healthcare System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 277-78 (2003); see also MCCONNELL,
GARVEY & BERG, supra note 8, at 264.
194 See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Ct., 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988); Hermanson v. State, 570 So.2d
322 (Fla. 1990). For civil liability, see Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. App.
1995).
195 South Dakota was the first state to repeal this exemption, in 1990. See
http://www.masskids.org. See also MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR CHILDREN, JEOPARDIZING
CHILDREN'S LIVES: A POLICY REPORT ON THE NEED FOR THE U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES TO REQUIRE REPEAL OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS TO MEDICAL CARE FOR CHILDREN,
http://www.masskids.org/jcl/cl-2.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
196 See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 31 n.81.
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a RFRA analysis when federal law would otherwise be applicable. 97 Were this
to happen, churches would not enjoy an automatic exemption but would have to
prove in each case that applying a given law would actually burden its religious
belief or practice and that the law did not represent a compelling interest. Using
RFRA would allow courts to delve into the connection between the exemption
and the substantive impact on the common good, something the ministerial ex-
ception now precludes.
2. Exemptions That Relieve Financial Burdens
The second category of exemptions involves those that relieve churches
of financial burdens. These exemptions make it possible or easier for churches
to advance their ministries and missions because their donations are not diverted
to other, state mandated expenses. Thus, like the autonomy-based exemptions,
these exemptions allow for self-constitution and self-definition and promote
pluralism. When they benefit the larger charitable sector, exemptions from fi-
nancial burdens serve a significant boundary maintenance function. 198 But
unlike the autonomy-based exemptions, there is a greater concern with the sub-
stantive compatibility between the church's norms and the society's norms. Tax
exemptions and the charitable immunity doctrine-two traditional mechanisms
for lifting financial burdens-always expected a broad public benefit from
churches, charities and schools in exchange for the lifting of those burdens. 99
This suggests that some scrutiny is appropriate as to social impact in this cate-
gory of exemptions.
This exemption category goes well beyond income and property taxa-
tion. Churches are exempt from federal laws governing pension benefits and
retirement income,2°° and unemployment compensation, 20' to name a few. Fur-
ther, the exemptions in this category do not necessarily relate directly to finan-
cial obligations. Some simply make ministries and missions less expensive for
197 Compare Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (RFRA applies to minister's age
discrimination suit against church), with Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th
Cir. 2006) (ministerial exception bars music director's age discrimination suit against church).
198 See Brody, supra note 97 at 586.
199 The IRS has been very careful to respect rather than judge normative differences of wor-
shipping communities; but it does exercise a clear normative judgments when it decides in the
first instance which churches are eligible for tax exemptions and when it threatens revocation for
violation of the political electioneering restrictions. In these ways the state decides which institu-
tions are socially beneficial, and further confines those institutions to the social as opposed to
political realm. For a critique, see Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr. On Not Rendering to Caesar:
The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to
Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1990).
200 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2000) (ERISA exemption); see also Henriques, Where Faith
Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, supra note 4.
201 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (2000); see also Henriques, Religion-Based Tax Breaks:
Housing to Paychecks to Books, supra note 4.
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churches, like exemptions from certain building and zoning requirements that
involve high compliance costs. Even exemptions from licensing requirements
for particular kinds of social service activities might be based entirely upon the
removal of economic burdens.
Exemptions from financial burdens usually pass muster under the Estab-
lishment Clause (because they are connected to the promotion of free exercise),
but have rarely been judicially created under a free exercise mandate.2 °2 Some-
times courts note that fiscal burdens can severely impair religious exercise, but
it is more common for courts not to find a constitutional violation when a law
203simply makes an activity more expensive. Part of this is attributable to the
fact that courts do not want to encourage a landslide of church requests for ex-
emptions from all kinds of laws that unintentionally raise expenses. But it is
also attributable to the sense that financial burdens are simply of a different ilk,
more attenuated in their connection to religious exercise.
Thus, exemptions from financial burdens will usually be legislative, en-
acted with the intent to encourage churches (and often other charities) to engage
in socially beneficial activity. Here a minimal social accountability is particu-
larly appropriate. Unlike autonomy-based exemptions, which allow for self-
constitution and self-definition and to which we often give great deference, ex-
emptions that lift financial burdens have their origin in fundamental social ex-
pectations. It might be going too far to say that minimal "trust" obligations are
attached to these exemptions, as it is inappropriate to apply to churches concepts
of trust duties that we apply to non-religious charitable institutions. Indeed,
certain forms of accountability to the state breach the most fundamental church-
204state independence. Yet it seems necessary to consider the impacts of exemp-
tions where church employee pensions have been lost, or where church employ-
ees who are laid off cannot obtain unemployment compensation.2 5 Likewise, in
cases in which churches enjoy a zoning exemption to alleviate fiscal burdens, it
seems necessary to ask whether the exemption enables them to benefit their
members and community or whether it primarily permits them to use their prop-
erty without regard to their neighbors.
202 See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Rector of
St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
203 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Rector of St. Bar-
tholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
204 For examples of direct attorney general oversight that raises constitutional concerns, see
ARtENS & DEsmo, supra note 55, at 565-79.
205 See Henriques, Where Faith Abides, Employees Have Few Rights, supra note 4.
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3. Exemptions for the Provision of Social Services
A third category of exemptions makes it easier for churches to provide
social services. Most fundamentally, these exemptions relieve burdens on
churches so they can relieve burdens on government. But there is more. "By
injecting a diversity of values and beliefs into the provision of social welfare,
religious organizations also strengthen pluralism and in addition offset the dan-
ger of a monopoly by government bureaucracy ... [E]xperience in helping
those in need can make religious groups independent, knowledgeable and credi-
ble participants in discussions about public policies. 2 °7
Many exemptions that relate to the provision of some socially valuable
service thus implicate autonomy concerns of self-definition and self-
constitution; they may involve the mitigation of financial burdens as well. So
we are dealing with a hybrid of sorts in this category. For instance, many ex-
emptions from land use regulation, judicial or legislative, attempt to do all three:
where a church seeks to expand social programs on its existing site, a zoning
exemption allows for the advancement of church ministries to serve people in
need; allows for the continued expression of the church's faith commitment; and
relieves some financial burdens by allowing the church to use property it al-
ready owns.
Exemptions in this area warrant a much more substantive evaluation of
both the internal ethical-legal norms that will function in place of the state's law
and of the social impacts of the exemption. As we recall from Yoder, we know
that the freedom given the Amish was not the freedom to be education-free. It
was freedom to use their own educational system. The Amish provide other
good examples. Self-employed Amish workers are exempt from having to pay
social security taxes because the Amish communities take care of their elderly
members. 20 8 The exemption permits the operation of an alternative system of
care, which allows the Amish to be faithful to their beliefs. 209 The Amish are
even freed from street safety requirements in some places because their alterna-
tive safety measures for their slow-moving buggies have been found to be more
effective than those required by the state.21°
206 See, e.g., Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, 224 F.3d 283 (4th Cir. 2000)
(zoning law exempted religious schools located on church property from needing permits for
expansion); Cohen v. Des Plaines, 8 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1993) (zoning law exempted religious day
care centers from the normally required special use permit).
207 Peter Steinfels, Religious Organizations Have Long Had a Role in Providing Social Ser-
vices to the Needy. Does a New California Law Threaten It? N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2004, at Al.
208 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (exemption discussed).
209 Id.
210 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (silver reflecting tape on slow-moving
Amish vehicles promoted safety goals even more effectively than the state's orange-triangle re-
quirement).
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The proliferation of Amish examples is attributable to the fact that they
are governed by a comprehensive alternative normative system. But a church
does not need to be an enclave community in order to claim an alternative nor-
mative system on a given matter. There may simply be areas in which belief
and practice differ from that of the wider society, and exemptions are needed to
permit those differences. Conscience exemptions for Catholic health care insti-
tutions allow them to provide health care while following the Church's moral
teachings on abortion and sterilization. 21' Food inspection exemptions that al-
low for ritual animal slaughter under kosher and halal rules allow the Jewish and
Muslim communities to market products and be faithful to their religious dic-
tates.
2 12
When churches serve the public, the need for accountability is height-
ened. The normative system that will govern in place of the state's law becomes
relevant to the potential beneficiaries of that service. Take the example of
church-run day care facilities that serve families from both inside and outside
the church. In ten or twelve states, church day care centers are exempt from
some or all licensing requirements. If churches are subject to a separate accredi-
tation system to ensure safety and health, sometimes more rigorous than the
state's, such an exemption is easily justified.21 3 Or if churches have a clear plan
that substantially complies with state safety and health regulations, even if not in
specific conformity with every legal requirement (such as with respect to the
number of toys per child), an exemption can be reasonable. But when the ex-
emption simply allows churches to provide services with no alternative plan in
place-other than the "quality control" of the pastor and congregation2 14 -- an
exemption is much harder to justify.
Holding churches to state requirements in the delivery of social ser-
vices-like the example of day care licensing-involves rather mundane issues
of compliance with public health and safety requirements. Churches that might
balk at this rarely complain that the state is imposing particular moral norms
(which would implicate autonomy concerns); instead, their complaint usually
concerns the economic burden of compliance. Yet courts and legislatures have
begun to show less concern even for the claims of moral burden resulting from
imposition of the state's norms. The highest courts of both California and New
York have decided that in order to promote the state's interest in gender equity
and women's health, Catholic Charities must provide contraception coverage to
its employees (in opposition to church teaching) if it provides prescription drug
211 Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Physician's Conscience, Conscience Clauses, and Religious
Belief: A Catholic Perspective, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 221 (2002).
212 Ryan, supra note 6, at 1446 n.217.
213 Noelle Haner-Dorr, Church Day Care Rules Raise Questions, ORLANDO Bus. J., June 24,
2002; Center Child Care Licensing Regulations (July 2005): States with Religious Affiliation
Exemptions, National Child Care Information Center, http://nccic.org.
214 See Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions Grow, supra note 4.
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coverage as part of its health insurance package.21 5 Further, in Massachusetts,
where same-sex marriage has been instituted, adoption service providers must
consider same sex couples just as they would other prospective parents. When
Catholic Charities refused under orders from the bishops, the exemption they
sought at the state legislature was dead on arrival. Apparently the prospect of
losing adoption services as well as the service provider carried no political
weight. With no judicial recourse available under Smith, Catholic Charities had
no choice but to end its provision of adoption services. 1 6 Such questions of
regulatory exemption are difficult because they involve both the provision of
services to the public and the preservation of institutional autonomy. In the
former, a high degree of compatibility with state norms is expected, but in the
latter case, very little. Further, they raise questions about the very definition of
the common good.
IV. UNITING THE EXEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE WITH HELP FROM CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT
Inasmuch as it involves explicit evaluation of religious norms as they
intersect with and support or thwart the norms of the state and society, using the
common good argument as a benchmark for decisions about exemptions is un-
doubtedly vulnerable to the extremes of legal pluralism and legal authoritarian-
ism. On their own, courts and legislatures might give unlimited deference to
churches (and in the process abdicate the state's role in protecting human rights,
civic peace and public morals) or might severely undervalue religious associa-
tional and expressive freedoms in the interest of uniform enforcement of the
state's norms. Is there a principled way to constrain the range of possibilities,
so that the common good argument can avoid both extremes? Two concepts
from Catholic social thought, both closely related to the concept of the common
good, are instructive: the public order function of the state and the principle of
subsidiarity. 2 7 Much like our constitutional design, these concepts work to-
215 See, e.g., Catholic Charities of the Diocese v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006), cert.
denied, 2007 WL 14904780 (U.S.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007); Catholic Charities v. Sacramento, 85 P.3d
67 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).
216 O'Ryan Johnson, Catholic Charities Hands Over Adoptions to Agency, BOSTON HERALD,
Apr. 29, 2006, at 5; Cicero Estrella, Catholic Charities Scaling Back its Role in Adoption Services,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3, 2006, at BI. The nation is divided over the issue of same-sex unions and
marital status. Seven states legally recognize same-sex unions. Thirty-nine states have constitu-
tional or statutory prohibitions on same-sex marriage or same-sex unions. A Hodgepodge of
Rights and Obstacles, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 18, 2007, at § 1.
217 Though "Catholic," subsidiarity has been understood as a quintessential American phe-
nomenon, allowing "individuals the fullest possible opportunity to reflect, choose, and act for
themselves, and to take responsibility for the outcomes. The principle is in the best sense democ-
ratic .... " Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of Civic Virtue, in
SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN
SoCiEry, supra note 38 at 131, 155-56. Similarly, public order provides "an understanding of
limited, constitutional government [and] provides us with a crucial framework for exploring the
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gether to value freedom over order: as much religious freedom as is possible,
and only as much restriction as is socially necessary. They provide specific
limiting principles on society and the state that are intended to protect the dig-
nity of the person and the common good.
Although it rejects the individualism of political liberalism, Catholic so-
cial thought always begins with the person, who is "the subject, the foundation,
and the end of social life. 21 8 It posits an inherently social person, one who is
"intelligent, reasonable, [] responsible . . . and situated,, 219 formed by and
through interaction with the institutions of civil society "with the ultimate goal
of encouraging and empowering the individual exercise of responsibility.
220
Because the human person is an active agent of his or her own destiny, and lives
in social "interdependence and relationship," all persons and all institutions-
social, political and economic-are called to contribute to the common good at
all levels.221
The public order function of the state, though defined by particular
tasks, is closely tied to promotion of the common good. Public order is, in
short, that part of the common good the state is empowered to coerce by law.222
Public order involves, first, "the effective protection of the rights of all citizens
and the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights; [second], the adequate protec-
tion of that just public peace which is to be found where people live together in
good order and true justice; and [third], the proper guardianship of public moral-
ity. ' 223 This function is broad indeed, and casts the state as an active force in
ensuring the common good is promoted, through its laws and through its own
governmental activities, but also (and especially) by coordinating the multiplic-
ity of the institutions of civil society. Significantly, the state does not wholly
define or control the common good, but "safeguards and promotes it."'224 The
definition is left primarily to the institutions of civil society and the processes of
deliberative democracy.225
relationship between human dignity, freedom, morality, and the proper function and limits of law
in the contemporary American constitutional order." Thus, it "deserves the attention of constitu-
tional lawyers because of what it can teach us about the nature of constitutional government:
government whose legitimate scope and power is limited by the demand for responsible freedom
that is rooted in human dignity." Gregory Kalsheur, Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons
for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 So. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 1, 6-7 (2006).
218 POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS para. 26.
219 Kohler, supra note 217, at 155.
220 Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 616, 619 (1994).
221 POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL CENTESIMUS ANNUS para. 86 (1991).
222 Carmella, A Catholic View, supra note 27, at 266-67.
223 Kalsheur, supra note 217, at 20.
224 Duncan, supra note 26, at 80.
225 See Coleman, supra note 30.
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The principle of subsidiarity helps to define the contours of the state's
public order function. It is the principle that "a community of higher order [e.g.,
federal] should not interfere in the internal life of a community of lower order
[e.g., local], depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in
case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of
society, always with a view to the common good., 226 A preference for lower
over higher, and for non-state over state, inheres in the principle. Subsidiarity
offers a normative vision of the human person situated within and empowered
by multiple, vibrant mediating institutions that protect the individual from the
state and market. Thus, any intervention or assistance from the state or from
larger institutions must not absorb or usurp the functions of institutions of civil
227
society, particularly of mediating institutions. In short, subsidiarity's goal is
"fostering the vitality of mediating structures in the service of human dignity
and the common good.,
228
Subsidiarity recognizes that devolution is justified only to the extent lo-
cal groups can accomplish their goals.229 Its preference for lower over higher,
non-state over state, "can always be overturned in light of experience .... The
operation of the principle presupposes the coordinating and rectifying functions
of the state. 23° In fact, together with the state's public order function, the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity not only justifies but often demands state action. "[T]he
state and other large institutions have the duty to undertake those functions that
neither individuals nor smaller associations can perform. From this perspective,
social institutions exist to supply help (subsidium) to individuals in assuming
self-responsibility. The subsidiary function of the community thus rests not in
displacing but in establishing the conditions for authentic self-determination.' 23'
When problems exceed the capacity of local mediating institutions, the
"help" that is often called for is governmental intervention in the form of money
or other resources to make local groups more effective. 232 Familiar (and contro-
226 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 221 para. 48.
227 POPE PIUS XI, ENCYCUCAL QUADREGESIMO ANNO para. 79, 80 (1931).
228 Duncan, supra note 26, at 74.
229 A reader familiar with contemporary political debates over the appropriate division of labor
between the power of the states and federal government will have already noticed how the princi-
ple of subsidiarity can be co-opted by those favoring extreme devolution to the states and a se-
verely limited federal government, and by those who believe that private institutions rather than
government at any level should shoulder most of the burden of curing society's ills. But Vischer
argues that "the strictly conservative portrayal of subsidiarity misconstrues the nature of the
Catholic social theory from which the principle arises . . . [and] also overlooks the affirmative
government functions essential to subsidiarity's faithful implementation." Robert K. Vischer,
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REv. 103 (2001).
230 John Langan, The Catholic Vision of World Affairs, 42 ORBis 24, 251 (1998).
231 Kohler, supra note 217, at 155.
232 For an excellent discussion, see Susan J. Stabile, Subsidiarity and the Use of Faith-Based
Organizations in the Fight against Poverty, 2 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 313 (2005) (describing
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versial) examples of such state/non-state collaboration include school vouchers
and "faith and community based initiatives., 233 But it would be wrong to put
exclusive emphasis on such a view of subsidiarity and public order. Subsidiar-
ity and public order sometimes call, even more forcefully, for exemption from
otherwise general laws to give mediating institutions "their own proper free-
dom."
The state is affirmatively obligated to protect the integrity of
lower level communities, helping them to achieve what they
cannot achieve on their own, and redressing wrongs committed
against them that they cannot redress themselves. On the other
hand, the state also has an obligation to refrain from interven-
tion where the lower level community can handle a matter on its
own, or where the intervention will cause undue disruption to
the relationships between the members of the lower order com-
munity. ,
23 4
"Handling the matter on its own" points to the independent capacity of
mediating institutions to promote the common good, to play a beneficial and
stabilizing role, to allow the functioning of independent non-state ethical-legal
systems. Exemptions, in this view, are not mere favors or privileges, but part of
the state's mechanism for discharging its duty to ensure freedom, coordinate
diverse actors toward the common good, and set conditions for the deliberation
necessary for defining the common good.
Therefore, subsidiarity and public order together have a structural im-
pact, "emphasiz[ing] that the common good is to be pursued in a particular way,
one that has much in common with traditional notions of limited govern-
ment., 235 This gives the mediating institutions of civil society wide latitude to
define and pursue the common good while the state's "subsidiary role ' 236 in
promoting the common good involves the coordination of their efforts. It "re-
frames our image of the modern state, envisioning it as a resource for localized
empowerment and coordination, rather than an arbiter and provider of the social
good." 23
7
How do the principles of subsidiarity and public order assist in our
analysis regarding exemptions? How do they help us determine when it is ap-
government funding and other ways of facilitating the work of faith-based groups, as well as those
tasks exclusively within the government's domain).
233 See, e.g., LuPu & TUTTLE, LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 86.
234 John F. Stinneford, Subsidiarity, Federalism, and Federal Prosecution of Street Crime, 2 J.
CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 495, 520 (2005).
235 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 221, para 86.
236 Kalsheur, supra note 217, at 24.
237 Vischer, Subversion, supra note 139, at 288.
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propriate to permit an alternative ethical-legal system to govern, or when it is
appropriate to impose the state's overarching norms? First, because these prin-
ciples focus primary attention on the civil society, a broad degree of normative
diversity is presumptively acceptable. Diversity and pluralism are features of
the conditions that provide for the flourishing of the human person. In fact, the
definition of common good is not so much one common good as a multiplicity
of common goods, many of which crisscross in a broadly stabilizing way. Iden-
tifying those aspects of the common good that are universal-for which multiple
conceptions are not acceptable-is part of the deliberative political and social
process.
Second, the public order function-especially as it is described in the
Declaration on Religious Freedom--entails a presumption in favor of freedom
"as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary."238 Ob-
viously, state restrictions become "necessary" when churches commit abuses on
the pretext of religious freedom, or directly interfere with the state's ability to
perform its rightful functions to guarantee human rights, civic peace, or public
morality.23 9 But by ordering freedom over restraint, "public order" suggests that
the state must look for the "least restrictive alternative" when curtailing reli-
gious freedom. 240  Additionally, there are prudential limits on law, in cases
where law will not be effective or might actually cause harms in other areas.241
Third, even given all these constraints on the state, the principles of
subsidiarity and public order provide a fundamental role for law in ensuring
social accountability. While these principles support limited government, they
also support an activist and moral government. When the institutions of civil
society cannot alone provide the proper conditions for the promotion of the
common good, the state must become involved. And in fact, governmental in-
tervention beyond coordination of non-state actors has been necessary in many
areas, such as the economy, education, health care, the environment, housing,
and opposition to discrimination. "Because the state's purpose is tied to the
promotion, protection, and coordination of the common good, its role is essen-
tially a moral one .. .,,242 Obviously the dialogue within the civil society on
the substantive meaning of the common good is a critical one. But through law
the state is a participant, not a mere umpire.
And yet a moral role for government is not necessarily the same as a
state that forces moral congruence on the institutions of civil society. Political
theorists recognize two positions. The model of congruence, which would re-
quire normative conformity among various social groups, acknowledges the role
of the state as moral educator, and views law as a tool that "defines and educates
238 Declaration, supra note 23, at 687.
239 Id. at 686.
240 Carmella, Protection, supra note 79, at 1050-51.
241 Id. at 1050.
242 Carmella, A Catholic View, supra note 27, at 269.
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its citizens. ' '243 In a heavy handed way the state reaches into civil society and
"invites state institutions to colonize social life in the name of progressive pub-
lic ideals.",244 An alternative model allows for more normative diversity and
posits that "public life can be sustained by a modus vivendi among competitive
groups, or by an 'overlapping consensus'.. .24 The question of exemptions
from general laws will increasingly implicate profound issues of the moral life
of the community. "To the extent that civil society flourishes and evidences
agreement about significant public values, greater degrees of congruence can be
tolerated. But to the extent that civil society is less open and more segmented,
with deep social divisions based on class or status, modus vivendi may be all
that is attainable. 2 6
V. CONCLUSION
As the Declaration on Religious Freedom teaches, and as the exemption
jurisprudence confirms, the right to religious freedom is exercised "in human
society.' '247 The common good argument, as developed in this article, has been
an attempt to think through the implications of responsible freedom. When we
see abuses, we are tempted to assume that exemptions inevitably undermine law
and social norms. But this would be a mistake. Churches are able to contribute
directly to the social conditions that permit the full flourishing of the human
person, and exemptions that enable these contributions promote the common
good. Multiple ethical-legal systems operating in place of the state's law pro-
mote religious freedom and diversity, and maintain the necessary boundary be-
tween civil society and the state. Such legal pluralism allows the common good
to be fostered structurally, by protecting what is distinctive. But this legal plu-
ralism may also promote widely shared norms and goals. When this happens,
the common good is fostered substantively, by protecting what is shared.
Social accountability is thus achieved sometimes by exemption, and
sometimes by legal regulation or restraint. The state coordinates mediating in-
stitutions, including churches, toward the common good, often by way of ex-
emption. But when exemptions threaten the common good-specifically by
violating human rights, civic peace or public morality, or by leaving social tasks
inadequately done-the state properly asserts its law as the exclusive law. The
common good argument, as set out in this article, recognizes that the entire en-
terprise of exemption jurisprudence must involve normative judgments if reli-
gious freedom is to be exercised responsibly, "in human society."
243 Rosenblum & Post, Introduction, supra note 34, at 13.
244 Id.
245 Id, at 14.
246 Id. at 14-15.
247 Declaration, supra note 23, at 685.
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